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Abstract. The objective of this paper is to investigate whether mergers create value for shareholders in both the
short and long term. For this purpose, 120 announcements of mergers that were registered in Italy during the
period 1994-2006 among listed companies were examined. The short-term analysis was conducted using the event
study methodology in order to estimate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in the time window around the
announcement date (-10, +10). In this work, the sample of 120 mergers was divided into two sub-samples: the
first considers the mergers that were carried out in all sectors of the economy, and the second focuses only on
bank mergers. From the results obtained it would appear that, while the sub-sample of all mergers registered a
statistically significant value creation for the shareholders of both the bidder and target companies, values also
confirmed by combined analysis, the second sub-sample registered negative values for bidder companies and
positive values for target companies. Negative values also seem to be confirmed by the results of the combined
analysis both at the date of announcement and throughout the entire period of observation. For the long-term
analysis the Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns methodology (BHARs) was used, with which it was possible to
observe the returns for three years. In the 36months following the merger, the portfolio showed a significant
destruction of value.
Keywords: Post-Merger Performance; Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns; Cumulative Abnormal Returns; Banks;
Italian Stock Market.

1. Introduction
In Italy the market for Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) has shown an upward trend during the nineties,
continuing more slowly during the last decade. In particular, there has been significant trend during the time
period1994-2000 and another more restrained trend in the period2001-2006.In the period understudies, a
“liveliness" was detected in the banking sector in the midst of reorganization process which began in the early
nineties.
From 1994 to2006, the value of M&A shares varied from 20,000million to140 billion Euros in1999.From2000 to
2006 it rose from129 billion to 100billion Euros(KPMG, Annual report).The average value of transactions stood
between 30 and260 million Euros in the period examined. The market value of the targets amounted to208, 068
million Euros and that of thebiddersaround467, 484 million Euros. The relative size assumed values of44.51%
(Table 1).
The market value of the bank targets stood atover53, 000 million Euros and that of the bidder’s at251, 714 million
Euros, for a relative size equal to21.26%.
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Table 1: Number of Mergers announcements, Market Value of Bidder and Target, Total Market Value and
Relative size of sample for the period 1994-2006. The data are in millions of Euros.
Period
Announcemen
Relative
MVB
MVT
MVB+T/M
ts
Size
V
1994
4
2,993
981
32.76%
2.55%
1995
10
4,847
2,187
45.12%
4.10%
1996
10
15,165
12,300
81.11%
13.55%
1997
6
5,539
4,703
84.91%
3.25%
1998
13
41,006
10,140
24.73%
10.54%
1999
7
75,069
19,753
26.31%
13.05%
2000
7
18,017
7,011
38.91%
3.06%
2001
10
122,175
30,546
25.00%
25.78%
2002
16
66,966
18,892
28.21%
18.75%
2003
6
2,886
19,523
676.39%
4.60%
2004
2
34,869
37,529
107.63%
12.46%
2005
8
43,577
6,068
13.93%
7.34%
2006
5
34,375
38,437
111.81%
9.48%
1994104
467,485
208,069
44.51%
10.49%
2006
Descriptive statistics of the sample
Average
Median
Min
Max

8
7
2
16

35,960
34,375
2,886
122,175

16,005
12,300
981
38,437

99.76%
38.91%
13.93%
676.39%

9.89%
9.48%
2.55%
25.78%

Note. Sixteen announcements were subtracted from the 120 initial announcements because of a lack of data. The
Market Value of Bidder and Target refer to the last year prior to the merger announcement. MV is the overall
Market Value.
On average, the total value of the companies involved in the merger process has affected 9.89%of the total market
value. In the period 1994-2006 their weight was equal to 10.49%of the total capitalization of the Italian stock
market and the highest value was recorded in 2001 and 2002 with a number of transactions equal to 10 and16 and
an average of 8.TheMVaverageofbiddersandtargetsamountedaround35,960and16,005 million Euros, respectively.
During the reporting period, average (9.89%) and median (9.48%) took on very similar values.
The objective of this work is to investigate the value created (or destroyed) by the merger transactions in both the
short and long term. In particular, starting from 120 merger announcements registered during the period 19942006, the equity performance of bidders and targets were investigated in the period around the announcement date
of the deal. The total sample was divided into two subsamples(banking and non-banking), which were examined
during the20 days around the announcement date with the event study methodology for the short term and the
Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns methodology (BHARs) for the long term. The post-merger performance of
40bidderswas observed in the three years following the merger.
The short-term results indicate a destruction of value for the bidders of the banking sector and statistically
significant and positive cumulative abnormal returns for the targets. The non-banking sample, on the contrary,
shows significant value creation for shareholders of both bidder and target companies.
The long-term analysis, however, shows a high and statistically significant destruction of value for both samples,
and the tendency of the portfolio of non-banking bidders to increase losses compared to the banking portfolio.
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2. Literature review
M&As are one of the most explored areas of research. The majority of empirical studies examine M&A together,
with no differentiation between the two types of transactions. The results found do not allow to come to a clear
conclusion1. For example Dodd & Ruback (1977), Kummer & Hoffmeister (1978), Bradley 2 (1980), Jarrell and
Bradley (1980), Asquith, Bruner, & Mullins (1983), Bradley, Desai, & Kim (1988) and Franks & Harris (1989),
found significantly positive values for both bidder and target companies.
Smith& Kim(1994) examined177bidders and targets in the period1980-1986in the ten days around the
announcement date and found negative and significant values for the bidders equal to-0.23%. Walker (2000), on
a sample of 278M&Asduring the period1980-1996in the four days around the announcement date, founds ergative
and significant values (-0.84%) for the acquiring companies. Sudarsanam &Mahate(2003), after examining a
sample of 519 buyers in the period1983-1995, found negative and significant values in both the short and long
term. The abnormal return sin the following 750 days range from-8.71% to -21.89% and are all statistically
significant regardless of the methodology used 2.
Campa&Hernando(2004) investigated 262M&As announcements involving EU companies in the period1998 to
2000and concluded that the targets, on average, registered positive and statistically significant cumulative
abnormal returns of 9%; the CARs of the bidders, in contrast, do not appear significantly different from zero, and,
in relation to cross-border M&As, in certain cases assume negative values.
Instead, Martynova&Renneboog (2006), after examining a sampleof3, 216 M&As announcements of25 European
countries, during the period 1993-2001, found in most cases positive valuesfor both companies in almost all time
frames observed.
Sudarsanam&Mahate(2006), after examining a sample of 519 buyers in the period1983-1995and considering
multiple methods and multiple contexts (Friendly, Hostile, White Knight and Multiple hostile) confirmed negative
valuesthroughout the pre and post acquisition period.
With regard to the short term results on mergers, there are the works of Asquith (1983), Eckbo (1983), Asquith,
Bruner, &Mullins (1983), which found abnormal positive values for both bidder and target companies in the
month from the date of announcement of the mergers. Dodd(1980) instead examined a sample of151 merger
proposals during the period1971-1977and found that at the announcement date the abnormal return for the target
was more than 13%while for the bidder it was negative and equal to-1.09%3.
Jensen &Ruback(1983)examined the results of several studies and concluded that the target companies recorded
valuesof 20%, while the bidders accomplished zeroing the case of successful mergers. On the contrary, in the case
of unsuccessful mergers, both companies registered negative values.
Franks, Harris, &Titman (1991) and Serves (1991) found positive and statistically significant values for the target
companies and negative values for the bidders.
Healy, Palepu, &Ruback(1992),during the ten days around the announcement date in the period19791983mon a
sample of50 large U.S. industrial mergers, found positive, high and statistically significant values for the target
companies equal to +45.6% and negative but not significant values forth bidders(-2.2%). From the combined
analysis they found positive and statistically significant values of +9.1%.
Kohers&Kohers (2000) examined sample of1, 634mergers between high-tech companies in the period19871996and found positive and statistically significant values (+1.37%) for bidder companies between the
announcement date and the day following the announcement, regardless of the method of payment of the merger.
Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford (2001), on a sample of 4,256 mergers completed between 1973 and 1998, found
positive and significant values for the target companies and negative but not significant values for the bidders.
The combined analysis of values shows a significant creation of value equal to 1.8% in the three days around the
announcement date. In the long run instead, Mandelker (1974), Langetieg (1978), Asquith (1983), Malatesta
(1983), Barnes (1984), Magenheim & Muller (1988), Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker (1992), Loderer & Martin (

1

For athorough review, please refer to Agrawal & Jaffe (2000), Bruner (2003), Tuch& O'Sullivan (2007). 2
Dodd & Ruback (1977), Kummer & Hoffmeister (1978), and Bradley (1980) divide the sampleinto successful
and unsuccessful transactions.
2
Sudarsanam & Mahate (2003) use four differentmethods:Marketadjusted, mean adjusted, Size-adjusted and
Marketto Bookvalueadjusted.The observation periodvaries from-1 +1+41to+750 days.
3
Dodd’s studydiffers from the othersfor two reasons. On the one hand, because the author establishes the
eventdate as the date of announcement and not of completionof thetransaction,and on the otherbecause it is
thefirst workthat usesdaily returns instead of monthly ones.
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1992), Loughran &Vijh (1997), Rau & Vermaelen (1998), Jaffe & Agrawal (2000) found a significant
underperformance in the post-merger period.
Malatesta (1983), for example, after examining 336 mergers during the period 1969-1974, found negative and
significant average abnormal returns (-5.4%) for acquiring companies in the six months following the public
announcement of the merger, while during the same period the acquired companies experienced positive and
significant abnormal returns equal to 7.0%. In the 12 months post-merger, considering the date of approval of the
merger, the average abnormal returns were highly negative (-13.7%) and statistically significant.
Franks & Harris (1989), on a sample of more than 1,800 mergers in the UK in the period 1955-1985, found that
the acquiring companies registered significant and negative abnormal returns (-12.6) in the two years following
the completion of the merger.
Franks, Harris, & Titman (1991) investigated a sample of 399 acquisitions in the U.S. during the period 19751984, using different dates of announcement and in the following 36 months found values with different signs
depending on the benchmark used. While confirming the presence of negative post-merger performance, the
authors attribute this phenomenon to "benchmark errors". Loughran & Vijh (1997) investigated a sample of 788
U.S. mergers during the period 1970-1989 and in the 5 years post-merger found size and book-to-market adjusted
BHARs equal to -15.9%.
Gregory (1997) observed a sample of 452 M&As in the UK during the period 1984-1992 using six different
benchmarks and pointed out negative and statistically significant and variable CARs between -11.8% and -18%.
Rau & Vermaelen (1998), in the period 1980-1991 in the U.S., observed a sample of 3,169 mergers and found
negative and statistically significant values equal to -4.04% in the three years following the merger. In the same
period for a sub sample of glamour buyers they found negative and significant abnormal returns of -17.26%. The
authors concluded by confirming the underperformance in the long run for mergers and small but significant
positive abnormal returns for buyers in the tender offers. Mitchell & Stafford (2000) examined a sample of 2,068
acquiring companies during the period 19611993 and through the construction of two different Equal-Weight (EW) and Value-Weight (VW) portfolios found
negative and significant abnormal returns in the three years’ post-merger varying between -5% and -9% for the
EW portfolio and an abnormal but not significant return of -1.4% for the VW portfolio.
Kohers & Kohers (2000) examined a sample of 304 mergers between high-tech firms in the period 1984-1995 and
found negative (-37.39%) but not statistically significant values in the five years after the merger.
Black, Carnes, & Jandik (2001) during the period 1985-1995 examined 361 successful U.S. bidders and found
BHARs ranging between -13.2% and -22.9% for the following three and five years, respectively.
Ferris & Park (2002) investigated a sample of 56 mergers in the telecommunications sector in the period 19901993 and found negative (-19.80%) and statistically significant values in the five years following the merger.
With regard to the banking sector next to the event study methodology, it is common to use the accounting
approach and the analysis shifts to the observation of the evolution of fiscal indicators (ROE, ROA, operating
income, cost/income ratio, etc.) monitoring them throughout the period before and after the transaction.
For example, Berger, Demsetz, & Strahan (1999) considered the static and dynamic analysis of the effects of
M&As. The case of economies of scale and scope of the transactions under consideration are the focus of static
research, while the observation of accounting ratios, the search for efficiency and increased profitability achieved
through cost reductions and/or revenue growth, are elements that characterize the dynamic analysis.
Vander Vennet (2002) and Focarelli & Panetta (2003) found that the efficiency resulting from risk diversification
can be achieved in the short term, while the benefits to be gained through economies of scope and cost reduction
calls for a longer period of time to achieve them.
Piloff (1996) examined 48 banks during the period 1982-1991, using both the first and second approach, and
didn’t find significant changes in performance in the two years following the merger. De Long (2003) investigated
54 bank mergers during the period 1991-1995 and found that the only variable that can explain the differences in
long-term performance is the relative volatility of earnings. This shows that banks mergers get small benefits from
the diversification strategy.
Gupta &Misra(2007)examined 503 mergers during the period 1981-2004 in the three days around the
announcement date and found significant losses for the bidder banks (CARs -1.84%) and significant and positive
returns for the target banks (CAR +16.12%). In the long term they examined 214 transactions and in the following
24 months they found positive and significant values (BHAR +4.64%).
More solid evidence to support the benefits of M&As can be found in the work of Haynes & Thompson (1999)
who, after examining a sample of 93 British companies in the period 1981-1995, found significant and substantial
returns in terms of efficiency in the five years after the event.
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With regard to the event study methodology, the contributions of Neely (1987) are noted, who after observing a
sample of 26 transactions in the period 1979-1985 found positive but not statistically significant values for the
bidders. Becher (2000) examined 558 bank mergers in the period 1980-1997 and also found positive and
significant values for the targets (CAR +22.64%) and insignificantly positive values for the bidders (CAR -0.1%).
In the same work, however, after observing the subperiod 1986-1990, he found negative and significant values
The
results
achieved
by
Baradwaj,
Fraser,
for
the
bidders
(CAR
-2.14%)4.
&Furtado(1990),Cornett&Teharian(1992), De Long(2001), Houston, James, &Ryngaert(2001) seem more solid;
they found high and significantly positive values for the targets and significantly negative values for the bidders.
Similarly to the work of Becher (2000), Houston, James, &Ryngaert (2001) also found significantly negative and
higher values for the bidders by examining the sub-period1985-1990.
Conversely, the results that emerge from an examination of the M&Asin the European banking sector prove to be
more fragmented.
Cybo-Ottone&Murgia(2000), for example, investigated 54transactionsin the period1988-1997and
foundsignificantly positive values for both bidders (CAR +2.19%) and targets (CAR +15.30%).
Among the studies that examine M&As in Italy it is noted the work of Bigelli&Mengoli(1999)who, after
examining the acquisition announcementsof56 listed companies in the period1989-1996, found valuesnot
significantly different fromzero(CAR+ 0.48%) for the bidders in the thirty days around the announcement.
Rossi (2005) studied12 eventsofM&Asinvolving29largeItalian companies during the period 19992003, and overall found results that were in line with other works: a loss of value for the bidders and an increase
for the targets in the thirty days around the announcement. Unlike the bidders, however, on the day of the
announcement the abnormal returns of the targets were significantly positive. (+2.86%) 5.
With reference to the Italian banking sector, some works dwell on the operational (or accounting) approach, and
others on the event study approach and still others on both.
Resti (1998), for example, found an improvement in the efficiency and productivity of merged banks compared
to a similar sample that wasn’t involved in M&As during the period 1988-1998.
Resti & Siciliano (1999) restricted the analysis to a sample of acquisitions on 14 Italian banks (9 acquired and 5
buyers) in the period 1992-1997 and observed the behavior of the returns in three time windows, finding positive
cumulative abnormal returns for both buyers and acquired companies, and for the latter even negative values in
one of the three time windows. The two authors also proceed, through some fiscal indicators, with a check on the
possible link between stock market performance and fundamentals and concluded that there is a weak correlation
between CARs and fundamentals. Ferretti (2000) examined 75 announcements for bank takeovers in the period
1994-2000, out of these, 35 were Italian banks and 40 were banks in European countries. The author observed the
reaction of the market in three time windows, considering the bidders only, and concluded that the negative
abnormal returns of Italian banks are more substantial than those of banks in other European countries.
Savona (2002) also examined the bidders only, considering the period 1989-1997, and found close to zero values
in two time windows out of three. Considering the period that goes from the date of the announcement, the one in
which the Boards of Directors have deliberated, until the fiftieth day after, he found negative CARs and concluded
that on average the transactions examined did not create value.
Focarelli, Panetta, & Salleo (2002) found an improvement in ROE due to a more efficient use of capital and the
utilization of tax benefits. The acquired company showed an increase in profitability which, according to the
authors, is related to the improvement of the quality of the loan portfolio.
Intrisano & Rossi (2012) examined a sample of 72 M&As in the banking sector during the period
1994-2005 and found values in line with literature: the bidders registered negative and statistically significant
abnormal returns and the targets positive and highly significant values. The results of the combined analysis point
to a statistically significant value destruction.

4

Becher (2008)examined619operations which werecarried out between1993 and 1994 and found
confirmation in the previous results.During this period,the banking sector,however,subject tothe
Reformation,showed insignificantly negativevaluesforthebidders(-0.61%).
5
The sample examined was initiallycomposed of 29transactions involvingmultiple industrial sectors which
involved biddersandtargets. Onlyfor 7operations was it possible toexamine thetargets, because in the other
cases they were not listedor there wasn’t any data, this latter case being frequent inmergerswherethe merged
companydisappears from thelist. Therefore, it is clear that the reducedsample sizeand the inability toexamine
alltargetsdoes not allow to formulate a completed opinion, but simply allows to express a broad opinion.
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3. Data and methodology
The sample examined was made up of 120 mergers transactions carried out during the period 19942006. Its
construction required t e fulfilment of at least four requirements:
(a) knowledge of the announcement date of the merger 6 and its retrieval through the database of Il Sole24
Ore, an Italian financial newspaper;
(b) the presence of listed ordinary shares both for the bidder and target companies;
(c) the continuous time series of prices of the ordinary shares which was acquired by DataStream;
(d) The presence of significant number of bidders for t he whole period 1994-20068.
The data relating to the merger transactions were acquired by the 7Commissioned National per le Societal e la
Borsa (CONSOB) and from theBollettini di Vigilanza of Bankitalia.
The abnormal returns in the short term were calculated using the market adjusted model (or index model) for the
full sample8 and the MIBTEL index9 was used as a benchmark. For the statistical significance the methodology
of Brown&Warner (1985) was used. The Abnormal Returns were estimated as follows:

AR =R R
it

it

m(1)

where

Rit and Rmt are respectively the return of the i-th

security and of the "portfolio" at time t during the monitoring period, considering 234 days as the estimate range
(-244, -11)10.
The Cumulative Abnormal Returns Standardized (CARs) was calculated as follows:

CARs =CAR +A
it

it 1

it(2)

Assuming a “buy and hold “strategy for the entire event period.
In order to investigate the market reaction to the announcement of the merger, two different time windows around
the date of the event have been identified t (-10, +10)and t (-5, +5) as well as other asymmetric periods with
respect to this date. In particular t (-1, 0) while the banking sector has also used the window t (-60, +60) e t (-30,
+30) for the following period.
Finally, to quantify the value created or destroyed by the transactions as a whole, the combined values of the
ARs, and similarly of the CARs, were calculated using the following formula:

MVB,i

MVT,i

Ai(=tR) AB,i(+tR) ATi((3)
6

The samplemade up ofbank shareswas also analyzedusing the methodofFama,Fisher, Jensen & Roll(1969).
The different methodslead tosimilar estimates (Brown & Warner, 1985).
7
During the period of analysis two events were frequently registered: (a) that the bidders, in turn, became
targets and were delisted; (b) that on the same day the bidders announced their merger with multiple targets.
However, in view of 120 announcements it was not possible to examine a symmetric sample. The post-merger
performances, however, were observed up to the delisting of the bidder.
8
The samplemade up ofbank shares was also analyzedusing the methodofFama,Fisher, Jensen & Roll(1969).
The different methodslead tosimilar estimates (Brown & Warner, 1985).
9
The MIBTEL index isageneral basketwhich includes all the shares listed on theStock Exchange andhas been
active sinceJanuary 3, 1994. It’s avalue weightedindexthatis calculated everyminute during thecontinuous
trading phaseon the basis ofprices.It is preferred touse this index, representative of allsecurities listed on
theItalian stock market,because it is largerandcloser to the "market portfolio". It is important to note, finally,
that in calculating the returns, allthe adjustments(dividends,stocksplits,etc.) have been taken into
account.Hence the pricesfor both the securities and the basketare “Official Price” and “PriceIndex”,
respectively, andwere taken, as mentioned above, from Datastream. Currently it is no longer activeas it has
been replaced by theFTSEItalyAllShare.
10
The sample ofbank mergerswas also observedin the time windowof120 daysaround theannouncement
datebut usingdifferent time windowsincluding that of20 daysaround theannouncement date(-10, +10), through
which it was possible tocomparethe results with thoseobtained from the sampleof total mergers. The decision
toinvestigatethe bank sampleina longer time windowcomes from the factthat the procedure for bank mergersis
more complexat the procedural level.
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MVB,i+MVT,i

MVB,i+MT,i

where ARi (t), ARB,i (t), and ART,i (t)represent the abnormal returns at time t for the transaction i, MVB, and MVT,I
the capitalizations of the bidder and target companies, respectively of the last day of estimate.
To estimate the on-term abnormal returns the Buy and Hold Return methodology was used, suggested by
Barber& Lyon (1997).
The returns of the sample firms were calculated as follows:
T

BHRi,T=

(1+Ri,t)

1
(4)

t=1

where Ri,t is the return of the firm i in the month of event t and T is the holding period (T=12, 24, 36 months for
a total of 756 days). For an equally-weighted portfolio of stock the returns are calculated as:

1n
BHRP,T= BHi,T
ni=1

(5)

where BHRP,T is the average BHR of the portfolio, n is the number of stocks in the portfolio, and T is the time
period for which the BHR is calculated.
The next step consisted in estimating the Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns and the Buy and Hold Average
Abnormal Returns as follows:
T

T

BHARi,T=

(1+Ri,t)

t=1
nT
1
BHAARi,T=

ni=1

(1+Rbent)

t=1

(6)
T

(1+Ri,t)

(1+Rbent) (7)

t=1

The statistical

t=1

significance of BHARi,Twas calculated as follows:

BHAT
t

=
σ(BHi,T)/nt

(8)

BHART

Similarly for

BHAAR

i,T:

BHAT
σ(BH )/n
tBHAART=
i,T
t
Where

σ(BHARi,T )and σ(BHAARi,T )represent

(9)
the cross-sectional sample standard deviation of the

returns of n firms and nt is the number of Mergers in month t.
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4. Results and discussion
Table 2 shows how the bank mergers registered negative valuesfor bidder companies and positive values forth
targets. With the exception of the three days around the announcement date, the values of which are not significant,
in the remaining cases the valuesare negative and statistically significant forth bidders, while for the target
companies they are always positive and statistically significant.In a single sub-period, the bidder company
recorded positive (0.81%) and statistically significant abnormal returns.
Table 2: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Standardized (CARs) of Bidders and Targets for Mergers (1994-2006).
The table shows the results of the event study for 34 Mergers in the Italian Banking Market between Italian Banks
within the period 1994-2006. The number of Bidder companies is 34 and the number of Targets is 10.
%Po
%Po
Time
CAARs B
Z-test
CAARs T
Z-test
s
s
-2.31
38.2 4.40%c
5.17
70.0
(-5, +5)
-0.63%b
-2.01
55.8 5.06%c
7.98
60.0
(-10, +10) -0.57%a
c
(-1, +1)
-0.14%
-0.33
44.1 3.98%
5.61
80.0
-10.55
54.5 6.78%c
10.87
70.0
(-30, +30) -2.96%c
(-1,0)
-0.34%
-1.25
44.1 2.91%c
2.94
50.0
c
c
-14.50
38.2 4.58%
7.31
60.0
(-60, 0)
-3.13%
2.86
44.1 1.95%b
2.40
50.0
(0, +60)
0.81%c
c
c
(-60, +60) -2.60%
-12.50
50.0 4.13%
6.90
60.0
Z-test significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by a, b and c, respectively.
The analysis of the combined valuesshowed in Table 3confirms the trend of negative abnormal values. With the
exception of the window including the twenty days around the announcement date in which the valuesare close
to zero and not statistically significant, in all the other intervals the mergers were destructive of value in line with
the results produced from literature. The highest and statistically significant loss was recorded in the ten days
following the date of the announcement (-3.01%).
Table 3: Combined Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns standardized (CCAARs) for Mergers (1994-2006).
The table shows the results of the event study for 34 Mergers in the Italian Banking Market between Italian Banks
within the period 1994-2006. The number of Bidder companies is 34 and the number of Targets is 10.
Time

Z-test
%Pos
CCAARsB
(-60, +60)
-1.10%
-1.45
0.0
a
(0)
-1.87
0.0
-1.41%
(0, +10)
-3.98
0.0
-3.01%c
(-10, +10)
0.63%
0.24
1.0
a
b
Z-test significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by , and c, respectively.
From the results shown in Table 4it is easy to notice that unlike the sample made up only of bank mergers, the
sample which includes all mergers registered positive and statistically significant cumulative average abnormal
returns throughout the period observed for both the bidders and the targets.
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Table 4: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Standardized (CAARs) of Bidders and Targets for non-banking
Mergers (1994-2006).
The table shows the results of the event study for 70 Mergers in the Italian Stock Market within the period 19942006. The number of Bidder companies is 39 and the number of Targets is 67.
Time

CAARsBN
B

Z-test

(-5, +5)

1.65%a

2.00

(-10, +10)

2.49%c

5.28

(-1,0)

2.22%

c

7.95

%Po
s

CAARsTN
B

53.85 4.70%c
66.66 5.55%c
53.85 2.48%

c

Z-test

%Po
s

5.44

62.68

8.69

64.18

19.06
a b

61.19
c

Z-test significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by , and , respectively.
The analysis of the combined valuesshown in Table5 confirms the trend towards creating value for the nonbanking sample. Within the twenty days around the announcement date, in fact, there was a statistically
significant creation of value equal to 3.05%.
Table 5: Combined Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns standardized (CCAARs) for non-banking Mergers
(1994-2006).
The table shows the results of the event study for 28 Mergers in the Italian Stock Market within the period 19942006.
Time

CCAARsNB

Z-test

%Pos

(-10, +10)

3.05%c

7.65

53.84

(-10, 0)

2.58%c

6.07

53.84

Z-test significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by a, b and c, respectively.
In the short term the results are different pending on the sample examined. For the banking sector the values
obtained
are
in
line
with
Becher
(2000),Ferretti(2000),DeLong(2001),
Houston,
James,
&Ryngaert(2001),Intrisano& Rossi(2012).Instead, with regard to the total sample the results show a significant
value creation for the shareholders of both the bidder and target companies, also confirmed by the combined
analysis. These results are in line with the work of Asquith(1983),Eckbo(1983), Malatesta (1983),Asquith,
Bruner, Mullins(1983),Loderer& Martin(1990),Kohers&Kohers(2000),Martynova&Renneboog(2006),who
found positive abnormal returns for both companies. The results of the combined analysis, instead, are in line
with Malatesta (1983), Franks, Harris&Titman (1991), Servaes (1991), and Healy, Palepu&Ruback (1992), who
found positive and statistically significant combined values.
a. Long-term performance
Thelong-term resultsappear to conflict with short-term results in relation to thetotal sampleexamined. InTable 6,
in fact, negative results emerge forboth portfoliosexamined. In the 36months following themerger,
theportfoliosshowed asignificant destructionof value (BHAARs B-1.72% -24.64% BHAARsNB). In particular,
thehighest and most significant losses were registered in thetwo yearsfollowing the mergerin the banking
sector(BHAARsB-4.61%). The results found in this work are contrary to those of Gupta & Misra (2007), who
found positive and significant values (BHAR +4.64%). In a single sub-periodthebidders’
stocksregisteredpositivebut not statisticallysignificant values in the order of1.35%.The portfolio ofnonbankingmergers, however, always registered negativeand statistically significantabnormal returnsand between the
secondand thirdyear it registeredthe greatest losses(BHAARsNB-45.90%). For both samplesthere was a tendencyto
increasethe lossesin the two yearsfollowing the merger withthe difference that whiletheportfolio ofbank
mergerscontained thelossesafter two years, the non-banking portfolio registered the greatest part of the
lossbetween the secondandthird year.
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Table 6: Buy and Hold Average Abnormal Returns for banking (BHAARs B) and non banking (BHAARsNB)
Mergers (1994-2006).
The number of Bidders is 21 for the banking sector and 19 for the non-banking sector. The test of significance is
calculated using the Barber& Lyon (1997) procedure.
Months

BHAARsB

Z-test

%Po
s

1-6

-0.32%c

-2.96

1-12

-1.91%c

13-24

-4.61%c

25-36
1-36

1.35%
-1.72%

t-test

%Po
s

33.33 -2.04%c

-4.82

0.0

-3.55

16.66 -4.78%c

-5.16

0.0

-11.79

0.0

-23.24%c

-12.80

0.0

66.66 -45.90%

c

-51.40

0.0

27.77 -24.64%

c

-6.00

1.71
b

-2.13

BHAARsN
B

a b

0.0
c

t-test significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by , and , respectively.
The total returns of portfolio shown in Table 7confirm the results previously found. The highest and most
statistically significant losses were recorded in the three years following the merger. In the following 36months
theBHAARsTS amounted to-11.78%. This confirms the trend to increase the losses between the first and third
year with the prevalence between the second and third year (BHAARs -19.90%).
Table 7: Buy and Hold Average Abnormal Returns (BHAARs TS) for total sample of Mergers (19942006).
The number of bidder firms is 40. The test of significance is calculated using the Barber& Lyon (1997) procedure.
Months
t-test
%Pos
BHAARsTS
1-6
-6.73
0.0
-1.14%c
1-12
-6.76
0.0
-3.08%c
c
13-24
-21.40
0.0
-12.35%
25-36
-99.98
0.0
-19.90%c
c
1-36
-9.69
0.0
-11.78%
a
b
t-test significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by , and c, respectively.
In nosub-period is there assign reversal in the values. The Figure 1 shows the trend for BHAARs following 36
months.
Figure 1: The trend of Buy and Hold Average Abnormal Return (BHAART).
T = 1, 2, and 3….36 months for three portfolios: Banking (B); Non-Banking (NB); Total Sample (TS).

Right from the startthe market perceives the merger as not generating value and maintains negative reaction for
the following 36months. Apart from the portfolio of bank bidders which seems to show a zero trend with a
36
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substantial rise between the thirty-first and thirty-sixth month, the other portfolio assumes a persistent and
consistent negative trend throughout the entire period. The total portfolio instead assumes an intermediate trend
while showing a negative persistence.

Conclusion
A sample of 120 merger announcements was the subject of study in this work during the period 19942006 in the
short and long term. In particular, two equally weighted portfolios composed of stocks of banking and nonbanking bidders were formed. In the short term the sample made up of banking stocks registered a significant
loss for the bidder companies and positive and significant abnormal returns for the target companies. The portfolio
consisting of non-banking securities, on the contrary, registered positive and statistically significant abnormal
values for both the bidder and target companies.
The long-term analysis, however, showed that mergers do not create value, and that the portfolio of non-banking
mergers tends to register greater significant losses than banking mergers. The trend is seen particularly between
the second and third year where the abnormal returns are higher and more statistically significant in all periods
examined. The banking portfolio shows a tendency to recover the returns between the second and third year,
ending the period with a loss of -1.72%. Unlike the banking portfolio, the non-banking portfolio shows a tendency
to increase the losses significantly between the second and third year, closing the observation period with a
statistically significant loss (BHAARsNB -24.64%).
The examination of the total portfolio composed of two sub portfolios confirms a significant loss of value in the
36 months following the merger (BHAARs TS -11.78%).
In Italy, mergers are not "good news" and the results obtained both in the short and long-term analysis is in line
with literature. With regard to the long term, as in the work of Agrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker (1992), Loughran &
Vijh (1997), Rau & Vermaelen (1998), Jaffe & Agrawal (2000), Park &Ferris
(2002), Kohers & Kohers (2000), Black, Carnes, & Jandik (2001), Sudarsanam & Mahate (2003) and Sudarsanam
& Mahate (2006), in this one also negative results are confirmed, and in particular that mergers do not appear to
generate value for shareholders. The results obtained in this study confirm those found by Intrusion & Rossi
(2012) for the short term in the banking sector.
Most of the works examined showed negative abnormal returns before and after the merger regardless of the
methodology and the statistical techniques used. In this regard a number of possible hypotheses can be
formulated:
(a) The market is inefficient and therefore the abnormal returns represent the "price of inefficiency." This
explanation, however, remains weak, as Malatesta (1983) and Agrawal & Jaffe (2000) have noted;
(b) the synergies are overestimated (and overpaid) compared to their full extent and therefore there is the
phenomenon of "Hubris Hypothesis" (Roll, 1986);
(c) the estimation models are inadequate to investigate this phenomenon and this explains the presence of
abnormal returns. In this case, as Rau & Vermaelen (1998) pointed out, "Such tests should be used with
caution" (p. 252).
The fact remains that further investigations are needed to provide more solid explanations for the continual
presence of this anomaly that exists regardless of (1) the country, (2) the sector of the economy, (3), the size of
the samples examined, and (4) the time horizon observed.
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